目录和关于13的部分在这里[http://www.ourjg.com/bbs/dispbbs.asp?boardID=41&ID=3051&page=1]，我一点一点录，等录完了之后作一个整体的目录链接。
以下原书79页起至88页止：
Chang T'ing-yü
During the early years of his reign Yung-cheng tried out several inner-court associates, winnowing out those who would not do and promoting the others and increasing their responsibilities. Of these, the one who served the longest and in the highest capacity was Chang T'ing-yü (1672–1755). Chang had an unusual career. A Chinese who won the confidence of three Manchu emperors, he held several top inner-court posts. Yet he was very different from Prince I. There is no evidence, such as the enthusiastic imperial affirmations that attest Prince I's central role, that Chang approached parity with the prince or was ever able to act as forthrightly when face to face with his sovereign. Yet for several years following the death of Prince I—until O-erh-t'ai was summoned back from the southwest to the capital in YC10 (1723)—Chang was Prince I's chief successor in the inner court. For a few years Chang was even the major means by which Yung-cheng further developed his inner court.
Relatively few documents survive to help us tell Chang's story. Because Chang was at the emperor's beck and call in the inner court he was not, like General Yueh, the recipient of long vermilion imperial confidences. Moreover, although imperial writing occasionally refers to and even praises Chang's services and his name appears on many of the court letter rosters, nowhere do we find the equivalent of Yung-cheng's frequent mentions of Prince I's conversations and even arguments with the emperor. There is also a shortage of Chang's own writing. The palace memorials of all capital officials were excluded from the great compendium of memorials of his day, the Imperial Vermilion Rescripts [on the Palace Memorials] (Chu-p'i yü-chih). As for Chang's writings that do survive, of necessity they were swathed in formality and clouded with deference. Even his chronological autobiography(tzu-ting nien-p'u) strictly adhered to the stultifying form of an official autobiography and lacks spontaneous comments and personal insights. In what follows I have employed these scattered sources to piece together Chang's role at court, a subject worthy of study because for several years after Prince I's death Chang worked alone at the head of the inner court and was involved in most of the major problems of the day.
Chang T'ing-yü during the K'ang-hsi Reign
Chang T'ing-yü's family background was the springboard of his career. He came from a prominent Anhwei landholding and literati family who in the preceding generations had begun to do well in the civil-service examinations and achieve high office.His father, Chang Ying, had served the K'ang-hsi Emperor closely, was a member of the prestigious inner-court Southern Study, and at retirement held the post of grand secretary. Chang T'ing-yü made an unpromising start on his career by achieving a low examination score for the highest degree (chin-shih)—215th, which placed him in the third and lowest group of his KH39 (1700) class of 305 men. Such a score would ordinarily have meant that he would have been rusticated as a district magistrate, but because of his illustrious family connections he immediately won the opportunity for further study and a prestigious position as a Hanlin Academy corrector. In the two decades remaining in the K'ang-hsi reign he advanced steadily, receiving appointments as a member of the Southern Study, diarist, Hanlin expositor, subchancellor of the Grand Secretariat, official lecturer on the classics to the emperor, and, at the very end of the reign, vice president on the boards of Civil Office and Punishments.
Chang T'ing-yü's Official Posts during the Early Yung-cheng Reign
Immediately following the death of the K'ang-hsi Emperor, Yung-cheng began to use Chang, who was his senior by six years, in a variety of assignments. He drew on Chang's literary abilities and Hanlin experience by appointing him to the editorial boards of official publications, supervisory examination posts, and the roster of princely tutors.Chang's editorial positions included being vice-director of the Veritable Records Office, director-general of the Ming History Project, and director-general of the State History Office.Because he was a member of the Southern Study, Chang was thus being used as an inner-court link to certain outer-court publications agencies. These assignments were important. Through historical publications the dynasty promulgated its own interpretation of events and determined how its achievements would be understood by future generations. The Veritable Records of the K'ang-hsi reign, for example, is said to have suppressed details of Yung-cheng's dubious maneuvers to attain the throne, an editorial assignment that was masterminded by Chang T'ing-yü.
Family background may have given Chang his high start, but Chang also possessed genuine abilities. One of the emperor's edicts of YC7 (1729), for instance, praises Chang's excellent memory: "Ever since Chang T'ing-yü became a grand secretary [in YC4; 1726] he has listened to what I say and has been able to note it down entire, copying it out and sending it up for me to go over. [What he writes] tallies with what I have said." The remainder of this edict makes clear that the emperor's other edict writers were not so accomplished.As we shall see in the next chapter (and particularly in Table 2 there), Chang's name appeared more often than any other official's in the draft court letter rosters of the time. There is also evidence that Chang enhanced his usefulness to the throne by taking the trouble to learn Manchu well. The Ch'ien-lung Emperor occasionally rescripted the Manchu half of Chang's board memorials, writing in Manchu to do so, something he did not usually do for other Chinese officials. And under both Yung-cheng and Ch'ien-lung, Chang was appointed to several editorial posts that required Manchu (the imperial clan genealogy, the Manchu terminology section of the official Chin history, and the Nurhaci Veritable Records that chronicled the history of the dynasty's founding leader). Such positions were usually filled by Manchus and were unusual for a Chinese.
Chang's rise in the top levels of the central government began as early as the first year of the Yung-cheng reign. His first board presidency—at the Board of Rites—was conferred less than a month after the K'ang-hsi Emperor's death. Toward the end of the first year he was elevated to the much more important presidency of the Board of Revenue. In this capacity Chang, rather than Prince I, was sometimes in charge of the financial policy debates that led to memorialized recommendations prepared under his aegis.
Later Chang became part of the top Board of Revenue team that masterminded preparations for the northwest campaign. In YC3 (1725), the emperor appointed Chang to the newly created office of assistant grand secretary (hsieh-pan ta-hsueh-shih); at the same time, however, to set him apart from two others who were also promoted to the same rank that year, Yung-cheng further awarded him the more prestigious designation of "acting grand secretary" (shu ta-hsueh-shih). These were trial appointments, some with new titles probably invented by the emperor—favorite imperial devices designed to try out new men slowly and prevent ambitious and gifted officials from rising too fast. The award of such titles to Chang T'ing-yü suggests that early in the reign Yung-cheng had identified Chang as an official to be brought along with care in the hope that he would prove both talented and loyal. As we shall see, these imperial hopes were to be fulfilled.
Chang's early promotions were soon followed by a progress through the ranks of the grand secretaryship: first, in YC4 (1726), he became grand secretary of the not so prestigous Wen-yuan Pavilion; next he was awarded the slightly higher title of Wen-hua Palace Grand Secretary; finally, in YC6 (1728), he was honored with the highest possible appellation, Grand Secretary of the Pao-ho Palace.Shortly after this Chang was observed at work in the inner court rather than at the distant Grand Secretariat premises far away in the southeastern corner of the palace. One eighteenth-century observer later recalled the time he had been sent to serve briefly in the inner court in YC8 (1730), and described Chang as an "inner grand secretary" (nei chung-t'ang) and even as "prime minister" (shou-k'uei). As an inner-court confidant, Chang dealt chiefly with palace memorials and the court letter edicts (t'ing-chi) rather than with the outer-court routine memorials. As a result, a special appointment of an extra assistant grand secretary ensured that Chang's outer-court responsibility for reading the routine memorials would not be ignored.
At this juncture (after YC4; 1726), Chang's tenure at the Board of Revenue presented a complex situation. Ordinarily a board directorate (t'ang) consisted of two presidents, one Manchu and one Chinese, and four vice presidents, twoSuperintendents
Prince I
(from YC1/4/7)
Chang T'ing-yü
(from YC4/2/28)
Presidents
Manchu president: Hsu-yuan-meng Chinese president: Chiang T'ing-hsi (from YC4/2/28: appointed grand secretary "concurrently as before to be in charge of the Board of Revenue presidency")
Vice Presidents
Ch'ang-shou Sai-te P'ei Shuai-tu Wu Shih-yü
This diagram shows an unusual situation at the head of the Board of Revenue after Chang T'ing-yü was elevated to grand secretary on YC4/2/28 (1726 Mar. 31). Although commanded at the time to continue his board president duties, his name no longer appeared in the board tables, a signal that he had risen to the level of board superintendent. A similar situation occurred two years later when Chiang T'ing-hsi was likewise elevated to grand secretary and also ordered at the same time to continue his former board president duties. But in the latter case, Chiang's name was not removed from the board presidency list in the official board tables, so his superintendency—if as grand secretary he had one—was of a level different from Chang's, just as Chang's, with its use of the identifying verb "to direct" (kuan), was different from Prince I's post, which was identified with the verb "to superintend" (tsung-li).
Figure 4
Anomalies in the Board of Revenue directorate after it acquired its second
superintendent in YC4 (1726).
SOURCES: Ch'ing-shih 4:2609ff.; Ch'ing-tai chih-kuan nien-piao1:204–9.
Manchu and two Chinese, in fulfillment of the dynastic principle of dyarchy, or evenhandedness, in balancing Manchu and Chinese influence in government. Evenhandedness at the Board of Revenue, however, had been in abeyance since the first year of the reign because a strong Manchu board superintendent, the I Prince, had been superimposed above the two board presidents. But things changed again after Chang was appointed grand secretary in YC4 (1726) with the order to "continue as before in charge of [jeng-kuan] the Board of Revenue presidency."
At this point, even though he still had board president responsibilities, Chang's name disappeared from the official board president list, to be replaced by Chiang T'ing-hsi. The Board of Revenue now had three heads with three different designations: Prince I was the "superintendent" (tsung-li); Chang T'ing-yü held the anomalous post that was variously known by the characters for "to direct" (kuan or li) or to deal "concurrently" (chien) with "board president affairs" (shang-shu shih-wu); and Chiang T'ing-hsi was identified with the title ordinarily used for board president. (There was also a Manchu board president, but he seems not to have played a strong role.) As Figure 4 shows, this unusual structure was not a triumvirate of equals but rather a finely tuned hierarchy of Manchu superintending overlord at the top, an ordinary Chinese board president below, and Chang T'ing-yü floating somewhere in between. If the situation seems perplexing, that may have been just what Yung-cheng desired.
Honors for Chang T'ing-yü
Chang's upward rise to posts at the center of government was accompanied by imperial honors and gifts. Like Prince I, he regularly refused many of these; nevertheless they were usually awarded anyway following the required displays of reluctance and modesty. Thus over his protests he received a pawnshop, a residence (the Ch'eng-huai villa), honorific horizontal plaques, and on several occasions substantial gifts of money (the records show enormous gifts of ten, twenty, and even thirty-five thousand taels). In YC8 (1730), when an imperial award of twenty thousand taels was "earnestly refused," the emperor declared he was "not to refuse again."Yet because of his privileged position close to the throne, it may have been better for Chang to avoid the appearance of being an imperial favorite and forgo as many imperially bestowed honors as possible. In YC11 (1733) Chang was given another honor—special permission for a trip to his native place, T'ung-ch'eng in Anhwei province (his first in twenty-three years)—to take part in ceremonies in memory of his father. In addition to a handsome sum for travel expenses, the emperor granted him the privilege of using imperial post-service horses and grooms and ordered local troops and officials to protect and greet him at suitable points along his journey—rarely bestowed marks of imperial favor.
Yung-cheng's congratulatory eulogizing words, sometimes in his own hand, were another sign of imperial favor frequently bestowed on Chang. In his autobiography, Chang describes how at the time of the triennial Metropolitan Inspection in YC7 (1729) he handed in his resignation as required. The Grand Secretariat drafted the responding decree (p'iao) approving the dismissal, but, as Chang proudly relates, the emperor "did not make use of it." Instead "the emperor took up his own brush to write the response." The resulting edict praised Chang as "calm and upright, of broad scholarship," and added that ever since his appointment he had "toiled from dawn to dusk to deal with the myriad affairs of state to render assistance [to the emperor]." Another imperial gift was a horizontal plaque (pien-e), whose four characters complimented him on his "fine service." Even though Yung-cheng held tight the reins of government, fostering competitiveness and dispensing promotions sparingly, he was well aware of the great ability that underlay Chang's service and used his power of reward appropriately.
The importance of refusing imperial honors, especially those that might be publicly promulgated, is illustrated by Chang's audience conversations concerning the chin-shih examination rank of his eldest son, Chang Jo-ai. At the top of every chin-shih examination graduation list was a small, specially honored class of the three men who had placed the highest in all the empire that year. In YC11 (1733), Jo-ai won the third place in that top class for the year, the so-called t'an-hua rank.
Faced with this high honor for his son, Chang carried the ritual of refusals far beyond the prescribed three. Chang's autobiography records that when the eunuch first came to announce the good news, Chang immediately sought an audience with the emperor and, "taking off his hat and kowtowing," asked that his son be excused this honor. The debate proceeded, Chang earnestly and modestly wishing to avoid the honor—"to put him in the second class would be sufficiently generous"—and the emperor assuring Chang that when judging the examinations he had not known it was Jo-ai's paper he was assigning to the third place of the top class. As the autobiography relates: "T'ing-yü again knocked his head on the ground [in a kowtow] begging [to be excused], but as before [the emperor] refused and instead picked up the examination and wrote his decision on the cover, ordering the examining officials to announce it with the posted results." But this was not the end of the matter. In yet another audience on the subject, the emperor bestowed a scepter on Chang. Chang thanked his sovereign "and as before took off his hat and kowtowed," but the emperor remained adamant in his refusal to lower Jo-ai's examination rank. Once again the father argued: ''These great examinations take place only once every three years. . . . Several tens of thousands took the preliminary chü-jen examinations, and only a thousand or so passed; of those who came to the capital for the metropolitan examination little more than three hundred passed. To attain the third place in the top class [of three] . . . is too much." Finally the emperor relented. Jo-ai was demoted to fourth place, being denied membership in the top class of three examination honorees and instead listed at the head of the large second class.
This tale of ritual courtesies and entreaties is significant not so much for what it tells us about Chang Jo-ai's scholarly ability as for what it reveals about Chang's relations with both his sovereign and other court officials of his day. The son's demotion from such a high honor was a small price to pay to deflect the jealousy of other officials. Chang could accept private eulogies and unpublicized gifts from the emperor; he could not risk a great public honor without the dangerous appearance of being an imperial favorite who took advantage of his position to win undeserved preference. Moreover, in the same year another high inner-court official, O-erh-t'ai, had a son and a nephew in the same chin-shih class. For Chang to gain such a high honor for someone in his own family while O-erh-t'ai's relatives placed lower might have led to difficulties with the man who was his chief colleague as well as his rival in the inner court.
Chang T'ing-yü's High Role after the Death of Prince I
During YC8, 9, and 10 (1730–32) Chang T'ing-yü received another informal promotion and imperial recognition of his great talents. At this point the vacuum in administration following the death of the I Prince was intensified by the emperor's own indisposition—an illness that may have been exacerbated by the loss of the prince. Chang was called on to step into the breach and describes the situation in his autobiography: "From spring to autumn [of YC8; 1730] the emperor was not feeling well; he ordered myself, with the Grand Secretaries Ma-erh-sai [Marsai, a new inner-court servitor] and Chiang T'ing-hsi, to take charge of all government matters. In addition, we were to discuss prescriptions for the [emperor's] recovery with the imperial doctor. Occasionally, if there were any secret edicts, I was to stay [and handle them] alone."
The following year offered other occasions when Chang single-handedly assisted Yung-cheng. Beginning late in YC8 (early 1731), for instance, when the northwest campaign was renewed, "The emperor was extremely careworn and ordered [me] to be on duty in the inner court. From morning till evening, I did not dare leave. Sometimes I waited on the emperor until the first or second drum [8:00–10:00 P.M. or 10:00–12:00 P.M.]. This continued until the ninth month [of YC9; 1731], when the military affairs became quieter."
Yung-cheng depended so greatly on Chang T'ing-yü that once when Chang fell ill the emperor joked that because he had previously called Chang "his arm and his leg," now that Chang was sick he, the emperor, was stricken too.A Grand Secretariat clerk briefly on duty at the Summer Palace later recalled that in YC8 (1730) Chang had sat "alone in a room in the western part of the Southern Study," close to the imperial quarters, instead of working in other chambers with a group of high inner-court officials. Thus for two to three years in the middle of the reign Chang appears to have been closer to the emperor than any other high privy imperial assistant of the day. He had already for several years (since YC4; 1726) been in charge of the capital management of military supplies with Prince I, and since YC7 (1729) he had also been one of the supervisors overseeing the work of the new Military Finance Section attached to the Board of Revenue directorate. Although at the time of Prince I's illness Yung-cheng had appointed another grand secretary, Ma-erh-sai, to inner-court service, apparently Ma-erh-sai was not a success. After only a short tour of duty in the inner court he was given a command at the front in the autumn of YC9 (1731). As a result, Chang dominated the emperor's inner circle, and Ma-erh-sai may have shouldered very few burdens. This explains why Chang described himself as alone in the inner court over a considerable period of time, even when Ma-erh-sai was on hand. For a few years Chang fulfilled the top central role in the inner court—a Manchu-speaking Chinese at the head of the Manchu administration.
Chang T'ing-yü and Communications Management
Although Prince I was probably concerned with communications developments during the early years of the reign, Chang T'ing-yü has been credited with "fixing the forms" of the new court-letter edict system. Chang probably acted as inner-court edict drafter more than anyone else. His name appears more than any other inner-court servitor's on the Yung-cheng–period rosters of court letter drafters (see Table 2). Chang's edict-drafting duties probably meant discussing policy content with the emperor, writing out the first drafts, and submitting them for imperial approval. Thus Chang's influential position at court, particularly during the middle years of the reign, involved him in communications at the highest level, and policy discussions brought him in on the full range of problems confronting the emperor.
We know that Chang was probably also concerned with creating and maintaining sound document storage procedures. Early in YC6 (1728) he suggested that decrees on Eight Banners matters be noted for inclusion in the court diaries, along with Grand Secretariat and Six Board affairs (which were already being noted), "to facilitate keeping a record." Chang may also have been involved with the development of document storage in what later became the Grand Council reference collection (Chün-chi ch'u lu-fu tsou-che), which dates from YC7 (1729). Although Yung-cheng himself occasionally took an interest in working out sound archival curatorship methods, the many mid-reign memoranda on the subject—short notes to assure the emperor that the new filing procedures were being properly followed—were probably composed by the three inner-court stalwarts of the time: Prince I, Chiang T'ing-hsi and Chang himself.
Like Prince I, Chang was also used to receive and forward certain palace memorials. When the palace memorial reporting privilege was expanded to include provincial lieutenant governors and judicial commissioners, the privilege did not operate in exactly the same way as for higher provincial officials. Instead of having their reports go directly in to the emperor, these secondary personnel were required to submit their memorials to a high inner-court official who then passed them along to the emperor (chuan-tsou).The fact that Chang's was one of the offices used for this purpose underscores his concern with palace memorial development. In communications as in other areas, Chang discharged a great variety of tasks for the emperor. Because he was not attached to a statutorily constituted office with a defined mission, he could be asked to take on any responsibility that the emperor desired.
Chang T'ing-yü and Official Publications
Chang was also entrusted with official compilations and publications. Early in the reign he had held high editorial posts in the offices for compiling the Veritable Records and the Ming History. Later he dealt with other works, such as the Huang-Ch'ing wen-ying, a collection of court writings that included contributions from both emperors and high officials. When the edict ordering the compilation of the Collected Statutes (Hui-tien) was handed down in YC2 (1724) and Chang was just winning Yung-cheng's favor, his name had been second highest on the list of editors-in-chief (tsung-ts'ai). When the work appeared in YC11 (1733), Chang's name was fourth on the list of editors, after two Manchu princes and the aging Manchu grand secretary Yin-t'ai, but the three Manchus may not have contributed substantially to the work. With O-erh-t'ai, Chang was one of the two top editors of the collection of memorials and imperial vermilion responses of the time, the famous Yung-cheng Chu-p'i yü-chih. The Yung-cheng reign was not marked by strong attention to official publications; nevertheless, many of the official works that did appear carried Chang's name on the editorial rosters and probably his influence in the editing as well
Although Prince I was closer to the emperor than Chang and probably suggested many policies that were eventually put into effect, Chang has been better known in history. Until the archival revelations about the prince came to light, the full extent of his crucial role at the center of Yung-cheng's government was not known. Official historians may have suppressed the facts about the prince because he had to take responsibility for the unpopular policy of tracking down official indebtedness—for, as the emperor admitted, there were "small-minded persons" who attributed the government's drastic new toughness on tax arrears to the prince alone. The prince may indeed have been hated in his own time.The fact that Chinese rather than Manchu historians shaped many of the accounts of the period may also have helped emphasize Chang. In addition, Yung-cheng's attempt to reduce princely influence in his own government, as well as later declarations to the effect that Manchu dynastic law did not permit strong administrative roles for the imperial princes, would have made it undesirable to emphasize Yung-cheng's dependence on a brother. As a result, Prince I's contributions have not been well understood, while Chang was honored for the remainder of the dynasty. Chang was the only Chinese whose posthumous spirit plaque was placed in the Imperial Ancestral Hall (T'ai-miao). Years later another Chinese who came close to attaining this honor was denied it because, as the Ch'ien-lung edict announced, "He cannot be rewarded in the way that Chang T'ing-yü was."
Archival access now allows us to compare the achievements of the two men.
Both were informal and unofficial servitors, without legal status or statutory authorization in the administrative code of the empire. In this guise they were not only the ultimate tool of the autocrat—available to do the emperor's bidding without fear of interference from any statute—but also the embodiment of a substantial informal influence at the heart of the central government. Most of K'ang-hsi's inner-court servitors had been enrolled in legally constituted organizations such as the Southern Study and the Imperial Household or in traditional bodies of high prestige such as the Deliberative Council. By contrast, Yung-cheng's unofficial use of the prince and Chang T'ing-yü(and later others, such as O-erh-t'ai) heightened the inner court's informality and served the emperor's autocratic vision. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, this extralegal character of Yung-cheng's inner court created a new dynamic in the central government. The absence of legal limits became a significant stimulus in the following reign that allowed the inner-court servitors and staffs a swift and exponential growth.
The differences between the prince and the grand secretary were also significant. Yung-cheng appears to have used Prince I as a close confidant to achieve an autocratic governing style. With the kind of loyal and devoted assistance that the prince provided, Yung-cheng could hope that he would be able to direct the government of the entire realm by himself. In contrast, Chang T'ing-yü could not meet Yung-cheng's desire for a close confidant. He could not talk back to his sovereign or speak in the straightforward manner of Prince I. Although Yung-cheng trusted Chang and relied heavily on him, the two did not have as close and frank a relationship as did the emperor and the prince. Chang could not be the emperor's alter ego or "substitute" for him as had the emperor's brother. Yet at the same time, the fact that Chang was Chinese may have given him the advantage of being less threatening to the emperor than members of the royal Manchu circle and their grandee retinues at the capital. This consideration, along with Chang's administrative skill and experience, may have led the emperor to turn to Chang after the loss of the favorite. As a result, Chang was elevated to a position unique in the dynasty up to that point—a lone Chinese presiding at the apex of officialdom in the Manchu Ch'ing government.
桃红色的是等级较高的标题，蓝色的是等级较低的标题，那些蓝色的标题，应该是一样的字号，不知道为什么贴过来就变得有大有小了。编辑就麻烦斑竹姐姐了，我弄不清楚论坛上的这些字号都对应的多大。谢谢。
